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Abstract—This paper investigates the incentive mechanism
design from a novel and practically important perspective in
which mobile users as contributors do not join simultaneously
and a requester desires large efforts from early contributors.
A two-stage Tullock contest framework is constructed: at the
second stage the potential contributors compete for splittable
reward by exerting efforts, and at the first stage the requester
can orchestrate the incentive mechanism to maximize his crowd-
sensing efficiency given the rewarding budget. A general reward
discrimination mechanism is developed for timeliness sensitive
crowdsensing where an earlier contributor usually has a larger
maximum achievable reward and thus allocates more efforts.
Owning to the lack of joining time information, two practical
implementations, namely earliest-n and termination time, are
announced to the contributors. For each of them, we formulate
a Stackelberg Bayesian game in which the joining time of a
contributor is his type and not available to his opponents. The
uniqueness of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is proved in
each strategy. To maximize the requester’s efficiency, we compute
the optimal number of rewarded contributors in the earliest-
n scheme and the optimal deadline in the termination time
scheme. Our contest framework is applicable not only to the
closed crowdsensing with fixed number of contributors, but also
to the open crowdsensing that the arrival of contributors is
governed by a stochastic process. Extensive simulations manifest
that with appropriate reward discriminations, the requester is
able to achieve a much higher efficiency with the optimal selection
of the number of rewarded contributiors and the termination
time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rapid proliferation of
smartphones and wearable devices. They are equipped with
a plethora of multi-modal sensors and they possess powerful
computation as well as communication capabilities. With these
technological features, ordinary mobile users can actively
monitor their surrounding environments such as temperature,
noise, vibration, network connectivity and geographic position
without demanding sophisticated instruments. This leads to
a new paradigm of problem-solving known as participatory
crowdsensing: a requester releases sensing tasks and collects
contributed data from a number of mobile users that seek
their individual benefits or the benefit of their community.
Recent applications in [1], [2], [3], [19] adopted crowdsensing
to perform the indoor localization, collection of location
information and noise monitoring, etc.
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The efficacy of a crowdsensing system heavily relies on the
exerted efforts of mobile users. However, they are reluctant
to share sensing capabilities due to the cost of energy, data
traffic, time consumption, and risk of privacy leakage etc. A
large body of studies have been devoted to developing efficient
incentive mechanisms [4], [20], [21], [22], [23], [25], [26]
that can be roughly classified into two representative types:
all-pay auction [4], [23] and Tullock contest [20], [25]. In
the former, the requester usually plays the role of auctioneer,
and each contributor bids his efforts to the requester. The
winning contributor acquires the entire reward, while the
efforts of a losing contributor cannot be reimbursed. The latter
approach, unlike all-pay auction, splits the total reward to
all the contributors exerting positive efforts. Each contributor
receives a fraction of the reward proportional to his efforts,
and inversely proportional to the aggregate collected efforts.
Incentive mechanisms based on auction theory are in general
perfectly discriminatory, i.e. the best bidder wins the competi-
tion while the others lose for sure [25]. Owing to fear of sunk
cost, all-pay auction is inclined to discouraging the participa-
tion of relatively weak contributors [24]. In the light of its
potential limitation, [20] proposed to utilize Tullock contest
to maximize the total sensing time of contributors. Tullock
contest is partially discriminatory so that each contributor
gains a positive reward at the equilibrium if he exerts positive
efforts. Though serving as a salient incentive mechanism for
crowdsensing, the standard Tullock contest can be far away
from optimality when the contributors are heterogeneous in
their marginal costs of effort. Authors in [25] presented an
optimal discrimination strategy for Tullock contest when the
marginal costs of the users are heterogeneous in crowdsensing.
The basic rationale is to enable a user of smaller marginal cost
to exert more efforts under a Bayesian game framework.
In this paper, we consider partially discriminatory incentive
mechanisms at a new regime, namely timeliness sensitive
crowdsensing contest (TSCC). This is motivated by versatile
real-world crowdsensing applications where the timely sensing
results are more valuable to the requester. For instance, City-
Explorer [15] is a game-based crowdsensing system in which a
winning player sets as many markers as possible in a city-wide
game area within a finite time period by taking photos and
providing concrete information. OpenSense [7] enrols users to
perform real-time air quality monitoring at different sites of a
city. TruCentive [16], CrowdPark [17] and ParkNet [18] collect
the timely parking information from drivers and distributes to
those in need of it. NoiseTube [19] is a participatory sensing
framework for monitoring ambient noise in an area of several
square kilometers.
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2Though the above systems are designed for different pur-
poses, they share a set of similar properties. Firstly, the
contributors do not join instantly and simultaneously, while
the requester desires large efforts from those who joins the
sensing earlier. The joining time can be the timestamp of a
mobile user passing by a given sensing venue, assuming that
the task is announced at time 0. Secondly, the contributors do
NOT exert efforts to change the joining times; in stead, they
contribute efforts to execute the specific task. For instance,
a driver will not drive his car out solely for the purpose of
finding the availability of a parking lot. Executing a task such
as taking and uploading photos consume a certain amount of
resources. The cost of altering the joining time overwhelms
that of task execution so that the joining time of the contributor
is deemed as his property instead of his strategy to gain a larger
share of the reward. Hence, the joining time and effort of a
contributor are two orthogonal factors. To incentivize more
efforts from early contributors, a naive approach is to raise the
reward, which is obviously not desired by the requester. From
this angle, a fundamental question arises: can the requester
incentivize more efforts from early joining contributors by
designing appropriate discrimination mechanisms other than
increasing his budget for crowdsensing?
To answer this question, our first step is to examine in
what form a feasible discrimination strategy should take so
as to maximize the requester’s efficiency under the Tullock
contest model. Here, the efficiency is defined as the aggregate
weighted efforts brought by per-unit of the requester’s budget.
This metric shares the similar principle as those in [20], [25],
but is more general than a specific utility function. We model
the competition of contributors as a noncooperative game.
Each contributor selfishly maximizes his payoff that is the
difference between the received reward and cost of efforts. Our
analysis on the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) reveals that the
reward discrimination along with a “virtual nature contributor”
can leverage the requester’s high efficiency and the simplicity
of mechanism design: the reward discrimination endows an
early contributor the larger maximum achievable reward, and
vice versa; the nature player enables the requester to retain a
fractional of reward when the number of contributors is small,
thus improving his efficiency.
Once Tullock contest structure has been determined for
crowdsensing, our second step is to design practical incentives
with timeliness sensitivity. Two practical approaches are pro-
posed, the earliest-n strategy where only a subset of earliest
contributors are rewarded, and the termination time strategy
that any contributor later than a “deadline” will be ruled out
in this sensing task. In both strategies, they compete under an
incomplete information scenario because each of them only
knows his own joining time, while is unaware of those of the
others, or is impossible to predict the joining times of future
players. Hence, we formulate each competition as a two-stage
Stackelberg Bayesian game, in which the requester announces
the contest function to the contributors at Stage-I and they
compete for the reward with the probability distribution of
joining time at Stage-II. The existence and uniqueness of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) are proved for each strategy.
Based on these BNEs, the requester can compute the optimal
number of rewarded contributors for the earliest-n strategy and
the optimal deadline for the termination time strategy.
Our major contributions are summarized below:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
explore the design space for incentivizing more efforts
from the early joining contributors.
• We show that the reward discrimination is suitable to
elicit more efforts from early joining contributors. The
NE of the Tullock contest is analyzed where a set of
practical discrimination strategies are proposed to give
preference to the early contributors.
• We formulate Stackelberg Bayesian Nash games for the
earliest-n and the termination time strategies. The opti-
mal number of rewarded contributors in the former and
the optimal deadline in the latter are presented.
• The Stackelberg Bayesian Nash game framework is gen-
eralized to the open crowdsensing system where the
arrival of contributors is governed by a Poisson process.
• Extensive simulations manifest that the proposed strate-
gies can greatly improve the efficiency of the requester. In
particular, the distribution of joining times for the closed
system is derived from the WiFi access data of students
in a campus building.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Second
II presents the game model for participatory sensing with the
timeliness consideration. A set of practical incentive strategies
are proposed in section III. Section IV analyzes the Bayesian
Nash equilibria of incentive strategies and presents the optimal
parameter configurations. Section V extends the game frame-
work to an open crowdsensing system with Poisson arrival of
the contributors. The trace-driven experiments are performed
in Section VI. Section VII reviews the state-of-the-art work
and Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a suit of game models for
participatory sensing that take into account the joining time
of contributors.
A. Motivation and Basic Model
In most of crowdsourcing and mobile sensing applications,
the requester pursue not only high quality but also timely
efforts. However, recent research merely concentrates on the
quality or effort while assuming that all the contributors
participate in the crowdsensing simultaneously. In reality, the
contributors more often join asynchronously. To harvest more
efforts from the early joining contributors, the requester can
increase the monetary reward, which is obviously undesirable.
Our purpose here is to explore the design space for incentiviz-
ing timely and large efforts without increasing the requester’s
reward. The timeliness sensitive crowdsensing contest (TSCC)
possesses two key factors, one is the joining time and the other
is the exerted effort. The joining time is the duration between
the instant of task distribution and that of task completion. We
make an important assumption as the following.
3Assumption 1: The joining time and effort of a contribu-
tor are perfectly complimentary factors in the crowdsensing
contest. The effort refers to various types of resources used to
perform a sensing task, excluding those related to joining time.
The joining time of a contributor is determined exogenously.
This assumption manifests that the joining time and effort
CANNOT be confused together. As an example, in mobile
sensing applications, the joining time can be the timestamp of
a mobile user passing by the given sensing site, and the effort
refers to energy expenditure or even monetary cost to execute
this task. A rational contributor will decide how many efforts
he should spend on the sensing task, knowing his joining time.
In what follows, we deliver the mathematical model for the
incentive mechanism design.
We consider a crowdsensing system with one requester and
N potential contributors. The requester releases a task at time
0 with a reward budget B, and the contributors compete for
this reward. We denote by ei the effort made by contributor
i, and by ti his joining time. Define two vectors e and t
as e = {ei}Ni=1 and t = {ti}Ni=1. The core of crowdsens-
ing is the reward allocation mechanism that incentivizes the
high effort from contributors, by taking the timeliness into
consideration. We adopt a modified Tullock contest success
function (CSF) to characterize the competition among con-
tributors. Define e−i = {ej}Nj=1,6=i and t−i = {tj}Nj=1,6=i.
Let ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) be the reward obtained by the ith
contributor, given the sets of joining time t and effort level e.
There has
ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) =
eib(ti)
e0 + ei +
∑N
j=1,6=i ej
, ∀i, (1)
where b(ti), the maximum achievable reward of contribu-
tor i, is a function of his joining time ti. In this Tullock
crowdsensing contest, each contributor shares the total reward
proportionally to his efforts, and inversely proportional to
the aggregate efforts from all the contributors. The physical
interpretation is that a contributor acquires a larger reward if
he contributes more efforts, and a smaller reward if any of his
opponent spends more.
Two new features are introduced beyond the standard
Tullock model. One is the “reward discrimination” on the
joining times, that is, b(ti) ≥ b(tj) if ti < tj . An early
joining contributor has a larger maximum achievable reward
than a late one To be noted, there are two other discrim-
ination rules named “weight discrimination” and “exponent
discrimination”. However, only the reward discrimination is
suitable for our problem where we leave the lengthy analysis
in Appendix-II. The other feature is to introduce a constant e0
that if it is positive, the reward will not be completely assigned
to the contributors. If e0 is 0, when there are only a couple of
contributors, the requester has to assign the whole reward even
though a very small amount of efforts are collected. Actually, a
non-zero e0 is equivalent to adding a NATURE player, avoiding
such adverse situations. A larger e0 means that the requester
retains a higher percentage of reward. Denote by R the total
reward paid to the contributors:
R =
∑N
i=1
ri([e, t]). (2)
In the incentive mechanism design, the requester needs to
make the payment R equal to the budget B as the benchmark.
The payoff of contributor i, pii, is denoted as the difference
between his reward and the cost of efforts. Hence, there yields
pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) = ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])− ei, (3)
where the marginal cost of efforts is normalized as 1. When ti
is not included in the CSF, we can rewrite ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])
(resp. pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])) as ri(ei, e−i) (resp. pii(ei, e−i))
for simplicity. Concerning the requester’s utility, an immediate
contribution is no longer identically important to a late one,
even if their efforts are the same. Inspired by this observation,
we transform the importance of timeliness to the requester
into a positive weight wi(ti) (sometimes simplified as wi) for
contributor i. If ti < tj , there has wi ≥ wj . Define U as the
utility of the requester:
U =
∑N
i=1
wiei. (4)
Define E as the requester’s efficiency that is the utility
brought by per-unit payment:
E = U/R. (5)
The efficiency E reflects the amount of utility brought by
per-unit reward, and E serves as the metric of the requester
to quantify the performance of incentive mechanisms. Using
E instead of U provides an intuitive understanding on how
good an incentive mechanism can achieve. An auxiliary metric
is named as “discrimination gain” denoted by G = Ed/End
where End and Ed indicate the requester’s efficiencies without
and with discrimination. In what follows, we formulate two
different games to understand the competition of contributors,
and explore the requester’s utility maximization strategy.
Remark 1: We consider a single requester because it is less
likely that two requesters compete simultaneously over the
same set of mobile users.
B. G1: Complete Information of Joining Times
We formulate a noncooperative game to characterize the
competition of contributors in which the joining time is the
common knowledge. In practice, when a contributor exerts
certain efforts, he only knows his own joining time, while not
those of his opponents. However, the complete information
game allows us to gain important insights of the incentive
mechanism design in a more tractable way. The game G1
comprises three key elements:
• Players: A set of N potential contributors;
• Strategies: The action of player i is ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ;
• Payoffs: The payoff of player i is pii, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Each player selfishly maximizes his individual payoff. The
outcome of their competition is depicted by the famous Nash
Equilibrium as the following.
4Definition 1: (G1 Nash Equilibrium) The strategy profile
e∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G1 if there exists
pii(e
∗
i , e
∗
−i) ≥ pii(ei, e∗−i), ∀ei 6= e∗i , 1≤i≤N, (6)
where e∗−i is the set of efforts excluding e
∗
i .
Definition 2: (Individual Rationality) Each player will re-
ceive a nonnegative payoff if he exerts a positive amount of
efforts.
C. G2: Incomplete Information of Joining Times
The joining time is inherently a private information to the
contributors. Especially, when the earliest contributor exerts
his effort, he is by no means aware of the other’s joining time
that have not taken place. We hereby formulate a two-stage
Stackelberg Bayesian game to characterize the crowdsensing
contest where each player knows his exact joining time and
the joining time distribution of the other contributors. In Stage-
I, the requester announces the incentive mechanism and the
joining time distribution so that his utility is optimized and
the budget is balanced. In Stage-II, each contributor decides
how many efforts to use to maximize his individual payoff.
Stage-II: Contributors’ Bayesian Game. Except that the
players and the strategies are the same as those in G1, we
append three different elements for this Bayesian game.
• Types: The type of a contributor is the joining time ti;
• Probabilities: The types of all the contributors are drawn
from an i.i.d. priori distribution F (t);
• Payoffs: The payoff of a contributor is the expectation
E[pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])] (occasionally written as E[pii]).
Each contributor chooses his effort ei to maximize his payoff
with partial information. The equilibrium reached by the
competing contributors is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE)
stated as the following.
Definition 3: (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) The strategy
profile e∗ is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of G2 if
for all i ∈ N and ei 6= e∗i , there has
E[pii([e
∗
i , ti], [e
∗
−i, t−i])] ≥ E[pii([ei, ti], [e∗−i, t−i])] (7)
where e∗−i denotes the set of strategies excluding e
∗
i , and E(·)
denotes the expectation.
Stage-I: Requester’s CSF Choice. At Stage-I, the requester
can configure the parameter e0 and the functions b(ti) for all
i so as to maximize his utility, given the budget B. Formally,
the equilibrium (e∗0, b
∗(·)) is the solution to the following
optimization problem:
max E[E ]
s.t. E[R] = B. (8)
The requester’s efficiency is optimized on the basis of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium at Stage-II.
D. Comparison with Existing Models
Our game framework is closely related to but different from
the pioneering studies in [20] and [25]. The major differences
are summarized in three aspects:
• Discrimination Rule. There does not exist a discrimina-
tion rule in the crowdsensing contest of [20]. In [25], the
marginal cost of a contributor is his private knowledge
and the discrimination is based on the marginal cost. We
investigate the discrimination on the joining time of the
contributors where the origin is the different valuation
of the requester on per-unit of effort at different joining
times. The analytical framework in [25] does not apply
to our problem and hence a new framework is necessary.
• Closed and Open Systems. Only the closed system with
a fixed number of contributors is studied in [20] and
[25]. Our game framework is applicable to not only this
closed system but also the open system with the arrival of
contributors governed by a stochastic process. The closed
system usually exhibits the busty arrivals of the contribu-
tors while the open system has a more stable arrival rate.
We are lucky to see that the incentive mechanisms can
be orchestrated under the same framework in these two
divergent systems.
• Objective Function. The objective of the requester in
[20] and [25] is to maximize his total utility on the
efforts minus the payment to the contributors. We define
a new metric for the requester, namely the crowdsensing
efficiency. It is not constrained to the absolute net utility
in a particular setting, but is to quantify the utility of the
requester brought by per-unit of the budget.
III. TIMELINESS SENSITIVE CROWDSOURCING CONTEST
WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section, we analyze the competition of contributors
with timeliness sensitivity, and present important insights in
the design of practical incentive mechanisms.
A. Nash Equilibrium
According to the individual rationality property, a contrib-
utor will not exert efforts if his participation cannot bring
positive payoff. Hence, we need to scrutinize the participation
of players on top of a NE. For simplicity of notations, we
perform a change of variables by setting E−i =
∑N
j=1,6=i ej
(esp. excluding e0), E = ei+E−i and b(ti) = bi. We observe
that the utility function of each contributor i is strictly concave
in ei. Then, the first order condition describes the global
maximum of pii(ei, e−i) with respect to ei,
bi(e0 + E−i)
(e0 + ei + E−i)2
− 1 ≤ 0, ∀i (9)
where the equality holds upon ei>0. If this equality does not
hold, the maximum is obtained at ei = 0, in which contributor
i does not “participate” in the crowdsensing. Therefore, the
best response of the ith contributor to E−i is
ei(e−i) := max
{√
bi(e0 + E−i)− (e0 + E−i), 0
}
. (10)
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium must have e∗i = ei(e
∗
−i)
for each contributor. We have the following lemma with regard
to the participation of contributors.
5Lemma 1: (Principles of Participation) In the standard con-
test function, the participation of a contributor satisfies:
• if e∗i > e
∗
j > 0, there must have bi > bj ;
• if e0 ≥ bi, the ith contributor does not participate in the
contest; when e0 increases, the number of participating
contributors decreases.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
Based on the best response function in Eq.(10), there has
e0 + E =
(n− 1) +
√
(n− 1)2 + 4(∑nj=1 1bj )e0
2(
∑n
j=1
1
bj
)
, (11)
when only the contributors from 1 to n exert positive effort at
the NE. We hereby present a method to search the explicit NE
within N steps. The first step is to compute e∗ by assuming the
participation of n = N contributors at the NE. If e∗i is positive
for all i, the NE is obtained. Otherwise, if any e∗i is negative,
this means that some of the contributors do not participate
at this NE. By removing the concurrent contributors with the
smallest bi, we proceed to search until all e∗i are positive for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. The NE strategy e∗i is subsequently computed by{
e∗i = (e0 + E
∗)− 1bi (e0 + E∗)2, ∀1≤i≤n
e∗i = 0 n<i≤N
. (12)
The actual payment to the ith player is
ri([e
∗
i , t
∗
i ]) = bi − (e0 + E∗) if e∗i ≥ 0. (13)
The detailed algorithm to find the unique NE is shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 : Searching the NE
Input: b, N ; Output: e?
1: sort bi ∈ b in the descending order
2: for n = N to 1
3: Compute x∗i using Eqs. (11) and (13)
4: if x∗i ≥ 0 for all i = 0, · · · , n
5: exit
6: end
7: end
We next consider a special discrimination rule that the
basic idea is to set the larger maximum rewards to the early
contributors and 0 to late ones. Our purpose is to gain the
important insights on the design of discrimination rules and
on the parameter configuration.
MULTI-CONTRIBUTORS: e0 ≥ 0, bi = b ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
and bi = 0 ∀n < i ≤ N ; wi ≥ wj if i < j.
When the maximum rewards of the early n contributors are
identical, and the remaining late ones are not rewarded, only
the former ones participate at the NE. Their efforts at the NE
are given by (∀i≤n)
e∗i =
(
(n−1)b− 2e0n+
√
(n−1)2b2 + 4e0bn
)/
(2n2). (14)
The total reward paid to the contributors is R = bE
∗
e0+E∗
. Then,
the NE efficiency of the requester is
E(n) =
∑n
i=1 wi
2n2
·
(
n− 1 +
√
(n− 1)2 + 4
b
e0n
)
(15)
that yields n−1n2
∑n
i=1 wi ≤ E < 1n
∑n
i=1 wi, ∀e0 ∈ [0, b).
The upper and lower bounds are obtained or approximated
when e0 is 0 or is approaching b.
Special case 1): the requester is not sensitive to the joining
time (i.e. wi = wj = w for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ). The efficiency
E is greater than (n−1)wn and any discrimination (i.e. n < N )
yields a smaller efficiency.
Special case 2): the requester is interested in only the earliest
two contributions (i.e. w1 = w2 = w > 0 and wi = 0 for
all i > 2). The discrimination gain can be as high as N
2
4(N−1)
with the discrimination rule n = 2.
B. Understanding the function of e0
Introducing e0 adds the complexity to the analysis and
design of the incentive mechanism. We hereby investigate the
role of e0 and provide a simple guideline of configuring e0
through the above example.
(1) A positive e0 may prevent the participation of contrib-
utors with low maximum rewards. When bi is below e0 for a
late contributor, he will not participate in the sensing at the
NE. Hence, e0 precludes the participation of late contributors
so that the early contributors may exert more efforts.
(2) A positive e0 has a potential to improve the efficiency
of the given discrimination rule. According to Eq.(15), the
efficiency is an increasing function of e0.
(3) When the number of contributors, n, is large, the
efficiency gain brought by e0 becomes less remarkable.
Given n equal to 2, the efficiency is obtained by E(2) =
w
4 (1 +
√
1 + 8e0b ). Then, E(2) is w2 with e0 = 0, and
approaches w as e0 is sufficiently close to b. For n equal
to 100, E(100) is 99w100 with e0 = 0, and approaches w as e0
is sufficiently close to b.
(4) Choosing a large e0 is beneficial to the requester,
especially when only a few contributors participate in the
competition. However, a large e0 will reduce the number
of participants at the NE. In realistic scenarios, the mobile
users join the crowdsensing randomly so that the participation
of contributors is very sensitive to the joining times in the
presence of a large e0. Hence, e0 is suggested to be a fixed
fraction of b simply for the purpose of avoiding the scenarios
with only a couple of participants.
The KKT optimization is adopted for the optimal incentive
mechanism design. Due to the page limit, we leave the detailed
analysis in Appendix-I.
Remark 2: The requester can orchestrate the reward discrimi-
nation scheme to maximize his crowdsensing efficiency, given
the vector of the joining times. However, this is infeasible
in reality because the joining time of a player is not known
until he undertakes the sensing task. A practical incentive
mechanism needs to be announced before the crowdsensing,
and needs to be easily implemented.
C. Practical Reward Discrimination Strategies
We hereby turn the reward discrimination into reality, con-
sidering that each contributor is unaware of the joining time
of other contributors. Three practical strategies are proposed.
6Earliest-n Strategy: Let t1 until tN be the joining times of
all the contributors. Let T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ TN denote the
ordered values of t1, t2, · · · , tN . Then, {Ti}Ni=1 are called the
order statistics of {ti}ni=1. The earliest n contributors will have
a chance of being rewarded (i.e. bi = b ∀i ≤ n), and all other
late contributors will not be rewarded (i.e. bi = 0 ∀i > n).
Termination Time Strategy: The requester sets up a termina-
tion time T so that only contributions before T are rewarded.
Similarly, we denote by t1, · · · , tN the random joining time
of all the contributors. If ti ≤ T , there has b(ti) = b, and
b(ti) = 0 otherwise.
Linearly Decreasing Strategy: The maximum reward func-
tion is set to b(ti) = max{0, b− hti} for every player i. The
velocity h can be tuned to further optimize the efficiency of
the requester.
In the earliest-n strategy, a contributor is unaware of his
ranking in terms of the joining time; in the termination time
strategy, he is unaware of the number of opponents joining
before the deadline; in the linearly decreasing strategy, he is
unaware of the maximum achievable rewards of his opponents.
These uncertainties lead to competitions with incomplete in-
formation.
Remark 3: The linearly decreasing strategy is yet a different
implementation of the earliest-n strategy, which will be shown
later on.
IV. STACKELBERG BAYESIAN GAME WITH TIMELINESS
SENSITIVITY
In this section, we analyze the Stackelberg Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (SBNE) of crowdsensing contests. Optimal strate-
gies are proposed for the requester to maximize his efficiency.
A. Earliest-n Strategy
In our context, all the contributors are not notified whether
they are ranked as the earliest n contributors. Hence, as the
first step, we must compute the probability of being one of
the earliest-n contributors if the ith contributor joins at time
ti. Suppose that ti is the jth smallest joining time. Among
all the contributors, there are j − 1 contributors earlier than
him and N − j contributors later than him. Considering all
the possible rankings of ti no larger than the nth place, the
probability of being the earliest-n contributor is given by
Pi∈{n} =
n∑
j=1
(
N − 1
N − j
)
· pj−1(1− p)N−j , (16)
where p is the probability of a contributor joining before ti.
Note that in the earliest-n strategy, the number of participated
contributors can be at most N , though only the first n of them
are rewarded. Here, with certain abuse of notation, we can use
a function b(ti) to denote bPi∈{n}, and b(ti) is continuous,
differentiable and strictly decreasing w.r.t. ti. Then, the utility
of contributor i with joining time ti is simplified as
pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) =
eib(ti)
e0 + ei + E−i
− ei. (17)
For contribution i, the joining time ti is his private information,
while only the statistical joining time distribution of other
contributions is known as a priori. In this situation, we model
the crowdsourcing competition as a Bayesian game where
the join time of a contributor is characterised as his type.
We will apply the backward induction principle to solve the
proposed Bayesian game, i.e., first analyzing Stage-II and then
determining the optimal policy at Stage-I accordingly.
Stage-II: Finding Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For any
contributor other than i, i.e. j ∈ N and j 6= i, since each
tj is drawn from the common distribution F (t), the expected
utility of contributor i on all the combinations is given by
E[pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])] =
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
eib(ti)
e0 + ei + E−i
·
∏N
j=1,6=i f(tj)dt1 · · · dti−1dti+1 · · · dtN − ei. (18)
As the first step, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of
this Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: (Existence and Uniqueness of Earliest-n BNE)
The Earliest-n incentive strategy has a unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE) in the contest.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
We now turn to establish basic properties of pure-strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. As stated before, the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium strategy e∗ satisfies
e∗i (ti) ∈ arg max
ei≥0
E[pii([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i])]− ei, ∀i. (19)
Similar to the NE condition of the complete information game,
for each contributor i of the earliest-n scheme, the equilibrium
condition is given by
E
[ e0 + E∗−i
(e0 + e∗i + E
∗
−i)2
]
b(ti) ≤ 1, ∀1≤i≤N, (20)
with equality in the situation e∗i ≥ 0. Otherwise, the ith con-
tributor does not participate. In general, there does not admit a
close-form solution to this system of (in)equations. However,
we can still infer interesting properties of the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 2: (Participation and Bound under Earliest-n
Strategy) In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Earliest-n
scheme, contributor i’s strategy has the following property
(with a meaningful condition b > e0).
• If n = N , e∗i is positive with b > e0 for all i.
• If 1 ≤ n < N , there exists a t¯ such that e∗i is 0 for t > t¯
while e∗i is positive and strictly decreasing for t < t¯.
Especially, t¯ is no larger than b−1(e0).
• The upper bound of e∗i (ti) is
1
4b(ti) for e0 ≤ 14b(ti) and
is
1
4 b(ti)
2e0
(e0+
1
4 b(ti))
2 otherwise.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
Remark 4: A contributor may not participate in the earliest-n
contest if his joining time is later than a certain threshold.
Stage-I: Optimizing Requester’s Efficiency. In the
earliest-n scheme, the requester announces his reward allo-
cation function before the contest takes place. As mentioned
before, once e0 is chosen to be a fraction of the maximum
reward b, the efficiency is independent of b. The requester only
needs to configure an optimal n to optimize his efficiency.
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exerted by contributor i is e∗i (ti). This contributor generates
a utility of w(ti)e∗i (ti) to the requester. Since ti is unknown
to the requester, his expected utility on contributor i’s effort
is obtained by
E[w(ti)e
∗
i (ti)] =
∫ ∞
0
w(ti)e
∗
i (ti)f(ti)dti. (21)
Because the joining time is i.i.d. at all the contributors (the
assumption of identical distribution is not obligatory), the
expected total utility of the requester is
E[U ] = N
∫ ∞
0
w(ti)e
∗
i (ti)f(ti)dti. (22)
For each set of joining time t, the reward paid to all the
contributors is
R =
(
b
∑n
i=1
e∗i (ti)
)/(
e0 +
∑N
i=1
e∗i (ti)
)
. (23)
at the BNE. Then, the expected reward paid by the requester
takes the following integral form
E[R] =
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)
e0 +
∑N
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)
N∏
i=1
f(ti)dt1 · · · dtN . (24)
The requester needs to configure an appropriate b such that
the expected reward apportioned to the contributors is equal
to the budget B.
For each vector of joining time t, the efficiency of the
requester is given by
E =
(∑N
i=1 w(ti)e
∗
i (ti)
)(
e0 +
∑N
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)
)
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)
. (25)
Then, the expected efficiency is
E[E ] =
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
(∑N
i=1 w(ti)e
∗
i (ti)
)(
e0+
∑N
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)
)
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (ti)∏N
i=1
f(ti)dt1 · · · dtN . (26)
The optimal n∗ can be searched for no more than N times
in the above formula. The main complexity stems from the
multi-dimensional integral in computing the BNE at stage-
II. This multi-dimensional integral can be substituted by the
Monte Carlo sum via discretizing the integral zone into a large
number of multi-dimensional cubes.
B. Termination Time Strategy
In the termination time strategy, the requester only allocates
rewards to the contributors who join the contest before time T .
Obviously, a contributor later than time T will not participate
in the contest. Given the distribution of joining times, a con-
tributor arrives before time T is computed as p = F (T ). In this
game, the number of participating contributors is uncertain.
Denote by n1 the number of participating contributors in a
pool of n2 contributors in total. The probability that n1 out of
n2 contributors join before the expiration time T is given by
P(n1, n2) =
(
n2
n1
)
pn1(1− p)n2−n1 (27)
due to their i.i.d. joining times. We analyze this Bayesian game
using the backward induction as follows.
Stage-II: Finding Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We an-
alyze the expected utility of the ith contributor here. If he
participates, there will be at most N−1 other contributors. To
compute the expected utility, we exhaust all the possibilities
in terms of the number of contributors in the contest. For a
fixed maximum reward b, his expected utility is obtained by
E[pii] =
N−1∑
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−1−k · eib∑k+1
j=0 ej
− ei
=
∑N−1
k=0
P(k,N−1) eib∑k+1
j=0 ej
−ei, ∀1≤i≤k+1.(28)
When k is zero, the ith contributor only competes with the
Nature player. In this Bayesian game, each contributor aims
to maximize his expected utility. To begin with, we show the
existence of a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3: (Existence and Uniqueness of BNE for Termi-
nation Time Strategy) The crowdsensing contest using termi-
nation time strategy admits a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
The BNE is symmetric in which all the contributors joining
before time T exert the same amount of effort. According to
the optimality conditions at the BNE, the following equations
hold∑N−1
k=0
P(k,N−1) b(e0 + ke
∗
i )
(e0 + (k + 1)e∗i )2
= 1, ∀i. (29)
The above equation intuitively shows that an increase of b
induces more effort from the contributors. For the special
case e0 = 0, e∗i admits a close form solution, that is,
e∗i =
∑N−1
k=0 P(k,N−1) kb(k+1)2 .
Stage-I: Optimizing Requester’s Efficiency. From the
requester’s perspective, contributor i with the joining time ti
(ti ≤ T ) generates a utility w(ti)e∗i to him. For the special
case that no contributor arrives before T , the utility of the
requester is 0 for sure, and his efficiency is set to 0 as a
penalty of unsuccessful crowdsensing. Therefore, the expected
total utility of the requester is obtained by
E[U ] = N
∫ T
0
w(ti)e
∗
i f(ti)dti = e
∗
iN
∫ T
0
w(ti)f(ti)dti. (30)
The number of contributors whose joining times before time T
ranges from 0 to N . The corresponding probability of having
k participants before T is P(k,N). A fraction of the total
reward allocated by the requester can be solved as
E[R] =
∑N
k=1
P(k,N)
bke∗i
e0 + ke∗i
. (31)
Here, b is chosen to let E[R] be equal to the budget B.
One should be informed that the summation begins from
the subscript k = 1, which is unlike (28). This is because
Eq.(31) counts the allocated reward when there is at least one
contributors.
We next compute the efficiency of the requester. Denote
by t˜i the joining time of contributor i before termination
8time T . For each valid contributor, his joining time follows
a conditional distribution of that of the original joining time,
P(t˜i ≤ t|t˜i ≤ T ) = F (t)
F (T )
=
F (t)
p
. (32)
The pdf of t˜i is subsequently obtained by
ft˜i(t) =
f(t)
p
. (33)
We then compute the efficiency of the requester for each vector
of joining times
E =
(∑k
l=1
w(t˜l)(e0 + ke
∗
i )
)/
(bk), k > 0 (34)
when k out of N contributors are before T and E = 0
for k = 0. The expectation of E incorporates two kinds of
uncertainties; one is the number of valid contributors, and the
other is the exact joining times of the valid contributors. With
the detailed derivation in the Appendix-I, we have
E[E ] = (e0
bp
(1− (1− p)N ) + Ne
∗
i
b
) ∫ T
0
w(t)f(t)dt. (35)
The optimal termination time T is chosen to maximize the
efficiency of the requester, that is,
T ∗ = arg maxT
(
e0
bp (1−(1−p)N ) + Ne
∗
i
b
) ∫ T
0
w(t)f(t)dt
where p and e∗i are functions of T . The optimal T
∗ can be
approximated by enumerating a finite number of candidate
termination times or by a bisection search.
C. Linearly Decreasing Strategy
The requester sets b(t) as a linearly decreasing function
b(ti) = max{0, b − hti} where the velocity h is tunable
to maximize his efficiency. For the fixed h, the Stackelberg
Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be solved using the same
approach as that of the earliest-n strategy. In other words, b(ti)
is bPi∈{n} in the earliest-n strategy and is max{0, b−hti} in
the linearly decreasing strategy. Another exception is that the
earliest-n strategy needs to try different n, while the linearly
decreasing strategy needs to search the different velocity h.
One can choose a finite set of candidate h beforehand and try
them one by one.
D. Comparisons
Both the earliest-n and termination time strategies are
practical simplifications to the original complicated reward
allocation function. They constitute the contest with incom-
plete information model by using Bayesian game theory.
Though their basic ideas are to incentivize the early joining
contributors to exert more effort, they differ in several aspects.
• The type of the earliest-n strategy is the joining time,
while the type is the number of contributors joining
before time T in the termination time strategy (implicitly
determined by their joining time).
• A contributor arriving after a certain time may not exert
efforts in the earliest-n strategy, while in the termination
time strategy, all the contributors joining before T exert
the same amount of positive effort, and those arriving
after T will not spend any effort.
• The earliest-n and the linearly decreasing strategies incur
more complicated integral computations than the termi-
nation time strategy.
Remark 5: In the Bayesian game, each contributor is aware
of the joining time distribution of all the others. When the
joining time distributions of contributors are heterogeneous,
announcing all these distributions may divulge the privacy of
contributors, even though such information is anonymous. A
feasible solution is to treat all of them homogeneous and to
release the anonymous joining time distribution.
V. OPEN CROWDSENSING SYSTEM
In this section, we generalize our game framework to in-
corporate the open crowdsensing system with external arriving
contributors.
A. Modelling an Open Crowdsensing System
Our previous models consider a fixed number of potential
contributors, where the joining time of each contributor is
characterized by a certain distribution. This is actually a closed
crowdsensing system. In some applications, the requester is
open to the arriving contributors without keeping the informa-
tion of their personal joining time. Each arriving contributor
decides the amount of efforts for crowdsensing, knowing the
incentive mechanism and his joining time. Here, we suppose
that the potential contributors join the contest at a Poisson rate
denoted by λ. The public information is thus this arrival rate,
other than the joining time distributions of all the contributors.
Fig. 1. An arrival process and its arrival epochs {S1, · · · , SM}, its inter-
arrival intervals {X1, · · · , XM}, and the counting process N(t).
Figure 1 illustrates the counting process N(t) where Sm
denotes the joining epoch of the mth contributor, and Xm
denotes the inter-arrival time between the (m−1)th contributor
and the mth one. Note that the process starts at time 0
and that multiple arrivals cannot occur simultaneously (owing
to the infinite divisibility of time). The arrival process can
also be specified by two other stochastic processes. The first
alternative is the sequence of inter-arrival times, X1, X2, · · · .
These are positive random variables defined in terms of the
arrival epochs by X1 = S1 and Xj = Sj − Sj−1 for j > 1.
Hence, given the Xj , the arrival epochs Sj are specified as
Sm =
∑m
j=1
Xj . (36)
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m > 1 is sufficient to specify the arrival process where Xj
(1 ≤ j ≤ m) is exponentially distributed. The second alterna-
tive for specifying an arrival process is the counting process
N(t), where for each t > 0, the random variable N(t) is the
number of arrivals up to and including time t. The counting
process is an uncountably infinite family of random variables
{N(t); t > 0}. When examining a sequence of arrivals, we
usually consider a truncated counting process with a fixed
number of arrivals. We denote S(m) = {S1, · · · , Sm} be the
sequence of joining epochs, and denote s(m) = {s1, · · · , sm}
be the vector of joining times of this sequence.
The joint distribution of joining epochs is a known result in
queueing theory [30]. By convolving a number of exponential
distributions, the joint probability density function (p.d.f.) of
the sequence S(m) is given by
fS(m)(s
(m)) = λm exp(−λsm), 0<s1< · · ·<sm. (37)
Let fS(m)|N(t)(s(m)|(m, t)) be the joint density of
{S1, · · · , Sm} conditioned on N(t) = m and time t. Then,
this density is constant over the region 0 < s1 < · · · < sm < t
and has the expression
fS(m)(s
(m)|(m, t)) = m!
tm
. (38)
Here, Eq. (37) is the joint density of S(m) where SM can be
arbitrary in this sequence. Eq. (38) is usually the joint density
of S(m) in a fixed duration from 0 to t.
An interesting observation is that the joint p.d.f. is not
explicitly related to s1 until sm−1, but is implicitly coupled
in the conditions 0<s1< · · ·<sm < t. The conditional joint
density is uniformly distributed. For this Poisson process, the
probability moment function for N(t) (i.e. the number of
arrivals in (0, t]) is given by
PN(t)(m) =
(λt)m exp(−λt)
m!
. (39)
In what follows, we will investigate whether our analytical
framework for the closed crowdsensing system can be gener-
alized to an open system with external arrivals.
B. Earliest-n Strategy of Open Crowdsensing System
1) Stage-II: If a contributor joins the contest at time si, the
probability of having no more than n−1 arrivals is given by
Pi∈{n} =
∑n−1
k=0
exp(−λsi)(λsi)k
k!
. (40)
Then, the maximum reward that the ith joining contributor can
acquire is bPi∈{n} on average.
Consider a truncated counting system with a maximum
number of M contributors where M is reasonably large. The
basis of this simplification is that the joining of the potential
contributors after contributor M is usually too late from the
requester’s angle. The payoff of the contributor arriving at ti is
the same as that of Eq. (17) except for substituting Pi∈{n} in
Eq. (16) by the one in Eq. (40). For the ith joining contributor,
the p.d.f. of joining time distribution is given by Eq. (37).
When the ith contributor joins, he has no knowledge on
the joining times of all the others. After isolating the ith
arrival epoch from the arrival sequence, we assume the re-
maining sequence as the original Poisson counting system.
This assumption slightly deviates from the original arrival
sequence, while greatly reducing the complexity of modelling
the expected utility of the ith contributor. Then, for the
remaining (M − 1) contributors, the p.d.f. of jth contributor
is computed by Eq. (37). The expected utility of contributor i
on all the combinations of S(M) is given by
E[pii([ei, si], [e−i, s−i])] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ sM−1
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
eib(si)
e0+ei+E−i
·λM−1 exp(−λsM−1) ds1 · · · dsM−1 − ei, (41)
where there are M−1 integrals and i is not regarded as an item
in the range [1,M−1]. The procedure of finding the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium follows that of the closed crowdsensing
system.
2) Stage-I: At the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the ith
joining contributor exerts e∗i efforts that yield the utility
w(si)e
∗
i (si) to the requester. Because each contributor makes
decision independently, the requester sees a collection of
M contributions each of which depends on its own joining
time. For M contributors with the sequence of arrival epochs
{S1, · · · , SM}, the expected utility of the requester at the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
E[U ] = E[
∑M
m=1
w(Si)e
∗
i (Si)] =
∑M
m=1
E[w(Si)e
∗
i (Si)]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ sM
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
w(si)e
∗
i (si)ds1 · · · dsM , (42)
and the expected reward paid to contributors is
E[R] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ sM
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
e0 +
∑M
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
·λM exp(−λsM ) ds1 · · · dsM . (43)
For a vector of joining times S(M), the efficiency of the
requester is computed as
E =
(∑M
i=1 w(si)e
∗
i (si)
)(
e0 +
∑M
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
)
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
. (44)
Then, the expected efficiency is
E[E ] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ sM
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
(
∑M
i=1
w(si)e
∗
i (si))
·e0+
∑M
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
b
∑n
i=1 e
∗
i (si)
· λM exp(−λsM ) ds1 · · · dsM .(45)
Compared with the closed crowdsensing system, the analytical
framework of the open system remains the same. In fact, the
open system is very similar to the closed system except that
the joining time of an independent contributor is substituted
by the joint distribution of all the incoming contributors.
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C. Termination Time Strategy of Open Crowdsensing System
1) Stage-II: In an open crowdsensing system, the total
number of contributors joining before the deadline T can
be arbitrarily large. To avoid the analytical complexity, we
suppose that there are at most M contributors. For each
contributor arriving at Si ≤ T , he can estimate the probability
of meeting other k contributors with the joining times before
T . In this situation, there are (k+1) contributors in total
conditioned on the existence of at least one contributor joining
before T . Then, there has
P(k,∞) = exp(−λT )(λT )
k+1
((k + 1)!)(1− exp(−λT )) . (46)
We then substitute P(k,N − 1) in Eq. (28) by P(k,∞) in
Eq. (46). The Bayesian Nash equilibrium e∗i is solved in the
same way as the closed system. Given the arrival sequence
{S1, · · · , SM}, all the contributors with Si ≤ T will exert
the same amount of efforts, and those with Si > T will not
participate. In addition, e∗i is unrelated to the exact values of
arrival epochs S1, · · · , SM . Therefore, we denote e∗i = e∗ if
Si ≤ T and e∗i = 0 otherwise.
2) Stage-I: Given the arrival sequence S(M) =
{S1, · · · , SM}, the utility of the requester is:
U =
∑M
i=1
w(Si)e
∗
i (Si). (47)
When the requester designs the incentive mechanism, he will
estimate the number of arrivals before T using Eq. (39). Note
that Eq. (39) computes the probability of having m arrivals
before T while Eq. (46) computes the probability of “seeing”
other k arrivals before T by a tagged contributor. Suppose
that m out of M contributors join the crowdsensing before T .
The joint distribution of S(m) conditioned on N(T ) = m is
obtained by Eq. (38). The conditional expected utility of the
requester is
E[U|N(T ) = m] = e∗ m!
Tm
∫ T
0
∫ sm
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
(
∑m
i=1
w(si)) ds1ds2 · · · dsm. (48)
Considering all the possible scenarios regarding the number
of arrivals before T , we obtain the expected utility of the
requester
E[U ] =
∑M
m=1
PN(t)(m)E[U|N(T ) = m]. (49)
The expected reward allocated to the contributors can be
calculated as
E[R] =
∑M
m=1
PN(t)(m)
bme∗
e0 +me∗
(50)
where the budget is B.
When m contributors join before T , the efficiency of the
requester is given by
E = (∑m
i=1
w(Si)
)
(e0 +me
∗)
/
(bm), m > 0. (51)
The conditional expected efficiency is thus
E[E|N(T ) = m] = e0 +me
∗
bm
m!
Tm
∫ T
0
∫ sm
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
(
∑m
i=1
w(si)) ds1ds2 · · · dsm. (52)
At the first sight, one can observe that the requester’s
conditional expected efficiency involves a complicated N -
dimensional integral. However, the special structure of the
integral allows us to derive a much more succinct result.
Lemma 2: The conditional expected efficiency of the re-
quester for the termination time strategy can be calculated as
E[E|N(T ) = m] = e0 +me
∗
bT
∫ T
0
w(x)dx. (53)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix-I.
Eq. (53) gives rise to the expected utility of the requester
by traversing all possible m
E[E ] =
∑M
m=1
PN(t)(m) · E[E|N(T ) = m]
=
∑M
m=1
λmTm−1(e0+me∗) exp(−λT )
b(m!)
∫ T
0
w(x)dx.(54)
The optimal termination time T ∗ maximizes Eq.(54) where a
binary search approach can be used to find T ∗.
Remark 6: When the arrival of the contributors deviates
far away from Poisson process, our analytical approach also
applies, while the simple expression of the efficiency at the
termination time strategy is not obtainable.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to validate
the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanisms. Both
the closed and the open systems are considered.
A. Simulation Setup
We collect the WiFi access record of college students and
faculties at Guanghua Building of Fudan University. This
dataset spans one month, containing the anonymous user ID,
the location of APs, the time stamp of accessing APs. For the
closed system, we randomly select 20 users from the top one
hundred active users. Note that the active users will possess
enough samples to generate the meaningful distribution func-
tions of the joining time. Figure 2 and 3 display the cumulative
distribution function and the probability distribution function
of joining time where the starting point is 10:00 am and the
ending point is 4:00 pm. For the open system, we set an arrival
rate without using the collected data because the arrival rate
is too large in this tall building (e.g. more than one person per
minute on average).
The timeliness property is reflected by two examples in the
closed system: a step function w(t) = {1, 0.6, 0.2, 0} with
discontinuous points at t = {10 : 00, 11 : 30, 13 : 00, 16 :
00}, and an inverse quadratic function w(t) = (1 + 16 (t −
10))−2 for t ∈ [10, 16] (i.e. in the range between 10:00 and
16:00). To try more choices, we let the step function be w(t) =
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{1, 0.6, 0.2, 0} where w(t) changes abruptly at the normalized
time {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5}, and let the inverse cubic weight function
be w(t) = (1 + t/3)−3. The total reward for allocation is
B = 1 if not mentioned explicitly. We consider three different
sets of {e0, b} that have e0b = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}.
B. Closed System
Earliest-n Strategy. We compute the BNE numerically fol-
lowing the approach in [28]. The basic idea is to decompose
the continuous space into a number of multi-dimensional
cubes. Then, the integral is substituted by the sum of its value
on all the cubes. To reduce the complexity of traversing all of
them, we adopt the more efficient Monte Carlo integration
approach. When the number of contributors is large, the
computational burden is relieved for we do not need to traverse
the less important cubes.
Figure 4 illustrates the efficiency of the requester with the
step weight function as n increases from 2 to 20. One can
see that by limiting the number of rewarded contributors, the
requester can even double his efficiency. It is wise to choose
n to be between 8 and 12. Meanwhile, a larger e0b usually
brings a higher efficiency. One exception happens at n = 2
because the mobile users might not aways participate in the
competition thus yielding a zero efficiency occasionally. When
e0 is set to 0.8b other than 0.5b and 0.2b, the maximum
efficiency of the requester is improved by around 0.06 and 0.09
respectively. This implies that introducing a “nature” player
can effectively enhance the requester’s efficiency.
In Figure 5, we illustrate the efficiency with the inverse
weight function. As n increases from 2 to 20, the requester’s
efficiency increases in the beginning and decreases in the end.
The optimal n can be chosen to be six to eight.
In Figure 7, we show the efforts exerted by a contributor at
the BNE when he joins the crowdsensing at different times.
Each curve indicates a different earliest-n strategy. When the
joining time t increases, he contributes less and less efforts,
and upon a certain threshold he does not participate. An early
comer exerts more efforts than a late one. For different earliest-
n strategies, the participation threshold for a larger n is also
longer. In the proposed incentive mechanisms, n and b are
configured simultaneously so that the allocated reward equals
to the budget. Figure 7 shows the contour lines of the pairs
(n, b) with different budget Bs. Any point in a contour line
refers to a combination of n and b yielding the allocated
reward equal to the budget. We observe that b is a strictly
decreasing function of n. When rewarding more contributors,
the maximum achievable reward for each of them will be
smaller. Note that the efforts and the contour lines are solely
determined by the competition at stage-I, irrelevant to the
shapes of the weight function of the requester.
Termination Time Strategy. Figure 8 plots the efficiency of
the requester with the step weight function for the termination
time strategy. The efficiency is evaluated by postponing this
deadline for fifteen minutes every time. As the termination
time increases, the efficiency increases first and then decreases
where the highest value is achieved around 11:15 am. Figure
9 illustrates the efficiency of the requester when the weight
function is linearly decreasing. The optimal termination times
are nearly 11:00, 11:30 and 12:00 for e0 to be 0.2b, 0.5b,
0.8b respectively. Both sets of experiments demonstrate that
the appropriate selection of the termination time can greatly
improve the efficiency of the requester. In addition, a similar
observation holds when e0b chooses different values. Compared
with the case e0 = 0.2b, the requester’s efficiency improves
by nearly 0.04 at e0 = 0.5b and by 0.1 at e0 = 0.8b.
Figure 10 plots the amount of efforts exerted by a contrib-
utor under different termination times. The amount of efforts
decreases with the increase of the termination time, and the
rate of decline is especially large 10:00 and 11:00. The reasons
of this “cliff effect” are twofold: i) multiple contributors may
flush into the competition; ii) the amount of efforts at the BNE
is more sensitive to the change of the number of contributors
when it is relatively small. As the designer of the termination
time strategy, the requester needs to configure b and T jointly
so that the expected expenditure equals to the budget. Figure
11 shows the contour lines of (b, T ) under different budgets.
When the termination time T increases, more contributors
will participate in the competition at the BNE. Therefore, the
maximum achievable reward b should be lower so as to balance
the expenditure and the budget.
C. Open System
Earliest-n Strategy. Figure 12 shows that the efficiency
of a contributor increases first and then decreases with the
increase of the number of rewarded contributors. In this set
of experiments, the nature player has a significant impact on
the requester’s efficiency. When the earliest eight contributors
are rewarded, the efficiencies at e0 = 0.2b, 0.5b and 0.8b are
around 0.73, 0.82 and 0.92 respectively. Given the arrival rate
λ = 0.15, the inter-arrival time is exponentially distributed
with the mean of four hundred seconds. Thus, some potential
contributors may arrive very late. Introducing the nature player
may exclude the participation of late comers so that the
requester’s efficiency is improved. Figure 13 illustrates the
efficiency of the requester with the inverse function, which
the similar patterns are demonstrated.
Figure 14 illustrates the amount of efforts exerted by a
contributor where the x-coordinate indicates the joining time.
When the joining time becomes larger, the contributor is
inclined to allocating less efforts at the BNE. Figure 15 plots
the contour lines for the pair (n, b) with different budgets. The
larger budget B means the larger b for the fixed n, and the
larger n for the fixed b. Given the fixed B, the increases of n
(resp. b) results in the decrease of b (resp. n).
Termination Time Strategy.
Figure 16 and 17 show the efficiency of the requester with
the step and the inverse weight functions. Considering the case
of e0 = 0.8b, the peak of the efficiency appears at 0.5 hour
for the step weight function and appears at 0.3 hour for the
inverse weight function. We have two observations regarding
the efficiency of the requester. One is that the efficiency of
termination time strategy is better than that of the earliest-n
strategy. The other is that the nature player is less influential
in determining the efficiency of the requester. Compared with
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the case e0 = 0.2b, the efficiency is improved by around 0.05
at the peaks for the case e0 = 0.5b, and by around 0.1 at
the peaks for the case e0 = 0.8b. The main reason for both
phenomena is that the earliest-n strategy overly drives out the
late joining contributors.
Figure 18 illustrates the amount of efforts exerted by a
contributor at different joining times. One can observe a
similar “cliff effect” as that in the closed system. Figure
19 shows the contour lines of the pair (b, T ) where the
expected expenditure equals to the budgets. For a fixed budget,
choosing a larger termination time means a smaller maximum
achievable budget, and vice versa. When T (resp. b) is fixed, a
larger budget B requires the configuration of a larger b (resp.
T ).
VII. RELATED WORK
There is a growing literature on the optimal design of incen-
tive mechanism in crowdsourcing and mobile crowdsensing
applications. For instance, [5], [6] targeted at incentivizing
high quality user generated content in online question and
answer forums. [9], [10], [11], [12] provided entertainment-
like or monetary incentives for workers to label tasks in
MTurk. The proliferation of mobile handheld devices triggers
a variety of crowdsensing technologies. Pioneering sensing
systems consist of NoiseTube [19] for noise monitoring,
SignalGuru [14] for traffic monitoring, and some others [10].
We categorize the literature on incentive mechanism design
into two groups according to their methodologies: one is the
auction based approach and the other is the game theoretic
approach.
Auction based approach. DiPalantino and Vojnovic con-
nected crowdsourcing to an all-pay auction model in which
users selected among, and subsequently compete in, multiple
contests offering various rewards [4]. Singla and Krause [8]
presented a near optimal, posted-price mechanism for online
budgeted procurement in crowdsourcing platforms. Authors
in [9] modeled the interaction between workers and the
crowdsourcer as a reverse auction for task labelling under
strict budget constraint. Yang et al. designed an auction-based
incentive mechanism for mobile phones to collect and analyze
data [20]. Jin et al. designed incentive mechanisms based on
reverse combinatorial auctions that approximately maximized
the social welfare with a guaranteed approximation ratio [22].
Luo et al. studied an incentive mechanism based on all-
pay auction with more realistic factors such as information
asymmetry, population uncertainty and risk aversion [23].
Game theoretic approach. Authors in [5] studied the ques-
tion of designing incentives for online Q&A forums. Ghosh
and McAfee modeled the economics of incentivizing high-
quality user generated content using noncooperative game, and
investigated the highest quality at the NE under an elimination
mechanism [6]. Yang et al. [20] studied a platform-centric
incentive mechanism for maximizing the total effort from
contributors in mobile crowdsensing that utilizes a Stackelberg
game framework. Authors in [25] presented an optimal Tullock
contest model for crowdsensing with incomplete information.
The studies most relevant to ours are [20], [25] that utilized
Tullock-like contest models. In the pioneering work [20],
the crowdsensing was modeled by a complete information
Tullock game. [25] investigated the same contest model with
incomplete information that admited a BNE, and presented
an optimal prize function to maximize the total efforts. Both
studies do not consider the timeliness of contributions. We
rigorously show how an appropriate form of contest model
can be chosen, and propose two novel Stackelberg Bayesian
contest mechanisms to incentivize early joining contestants to
contribute more efforts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the incentive mechanism deign
for timeliness sensitive crowdsensing using the Tullock contest
framework. Each contributor is featured by his joining time,
and the requester has a higher valuation toward an early con-
tribution than a late one with the same effort. The core issue
faced by the requester is how to offer different preferences to
the contributors regarding their joining times, given the fixed
budget. Two representative reward discrimination schemes, the
earliest-n and the termination time schemes, are proposed. We
develop a Stackelberg Bayesian game framework to capture
the competition of the contributors without the complete infor-
mation, and to characterize the orchestration of the competition
by the requester to maximize his crowdsensing efficiency. We
prove the existence and uniqueness of BNE, and present the
optimal parameter configuration for each scheme. Our game
framework is powerful in its applicability to both the closed
crowdsensing system with a fixed number of players and the
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open system whose arrival of contributors follows a stochastic
process. Numerical simulations validate the effectiveness of
the proposed incentive mechanisms.
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APPENDIX-I: PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: i) It is easy to prove by contradiction. Suppose 0 <
e∗i < e
∗
j if bi ≥ bj . According to the expression in (9), the
left hand for i is greater than that for j. The right hand for i
is the same as that for j, which equality does not hold. Thus,
if e∗i > e
∗
j > 0, there must have bi > bj .
ii) When e0 is greater than bi, the left hand of the expression
in (9) is always less than the right hand. Hence, e∗i is 0 all
the time. For the same reason, the number of participating
contributors decreases if e0 increases.
B. Optimal Reward Discrimination
With the complete information on ti for all i, the requester
is able to steer the configuration of b(ti) (i.e. bi for brevity)
to maximize his efficiency (equivalent to utility maximization
when there is no uncertainty):
max
∑N
i=1
wie
∗
i
s.t.
∑N
i=1
ri([e
∗
i , t
∗
i ]) = B. (55)
The optimal design falls in the scope of nonlinear program-
ming. The individual rationality rule makes the optimization
problem not differentiable anywhere. Solving the optimal
reward vector b∗ involves complicated operations on some
implicit functions. For clarity, we hereby examine the optimal
incentive mechanism in the case e0 = 0. When e0 is nonzero,
all the procedures remain the same, and are omitted hence-
forth.
The optimization problem with e0 = 0 is simplified as
max
∑n∗
i=1
wi
( n∗ − 1∑n∗
j=1
1
bj
− 1
bi
(
n∗ − 1∑n∗
j=1
1
bj
)2
)
s.t.
∑n∗
i=1
bi − n
∗(n∗ − 1)∑n∗
i=1
1
bi
= B, (56)
where n∗ is the number of players with nonzero efforts at
the NE. Since n∗ is an inter coupled with the NE, this
optimization problem is inherently non-differentiable on bi.
To bypass this difficulty, we treat each n∗ as a constant in the
range [1, N ], and compute the optimal reward discrimination
vector {b∗1, b∗2, · · · , b∗n∗}. Then, the vector {b∗1, b∗2, · · · , b∗n∗}
is feed into the original game model so as to check the
individual rationality condition. If individual rationality is
satisfied, this vector maximizes the requester’s utility owing
to the uniqueness of the NE.
We use the Lagrangian method to solve the constrained
optimization problem. Define L(b, λ) as
L(b, λ) =
∑n∗
i=1
wi
( n∗ − 1∑n∗
j=1
1
bj
− 1
bi
(
n∗ − 1∑n∗
j=1
1
bj
)2
)
+λ
(∑n∗
i=1
bi − n
∗(n∗ − 1)∑n∗
i=1
1
bi
−B) (57)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimal b∗ max-
imizes L(b, λ) while satisfying the equality constraint in
Eq.(56). The standard approach of searching b∗ is to compute
the derivatives of L(b, λ) on each bi and let dL(b,λ)dbi = 0 for
each i, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n∗. Then, we express each bi as a function
of λ, submit all the bi(λ) to Eq.(56), and compute λ∗ and b∗
subsequently. Due to the complexity of the implicit function
bi(λ), a practical approach is to use a binary search of λ∗. The
iteration stops when the left-hand of Eq.(56) is in the vicinity
of B.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We apply results in [28] to prove the existence of
a BNE, and results in [29] to prove the uniqueness. For
consistency with [28] and [29], it is useful to perform the
change of variables ci := − 1b(ti) . Then, contributor i’s payoff
is equivalent to
pii(e, ci) = b(ti)
( ei
e0 + ei + E−i
+ ciei
)
(58)
where ei ∈ [0, b] and ci ∈ (−∞,− 1b ]. Consider a constant
c ∈ (−∞,− 1b ], the probability distribution of ci is obtained
by
P(ci ≤ c) = P( −1
b(ti)
≤ c) = P(b(ti) ≤ −1
c
)
= P
(
ti ≥ b−1(−1
c
)
)
= 1− F (b−1(−1
c
)
)
,
where b−1(·) is an inverse function for b(ti) = bPi∈{n}.
Hence, each ci is drawn from the distribution Fˆi(ci) =
1 − Fi(b−1(− 1ci )). Given a strategy xj : [−∞,− 1b ] → [0, b]
for each j 6= i, contributor i’s expected payoff amounts to
E[pii(e, ci)] = b(ti)
(∫ − 1b
−∞
· · ·
∫ − 1b
−∞
ei
e0 + ei + E−i
N∏
j=1,6=i
dFˆj(cj) + cixi
)
.
We take the partial derivative of E[pii(e, ci)] over ei and ci
so to have d
2E[pii(e,ci)]
deidci
= 1 > 0. According to [28], the
single crossing condition for an incomplete information game
is satisfied. In addition, E[pii(e, ci)] is continuous as long as
e0 > 0, which satisfies the requirements of uniqueness. Hence,
there exists a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The uniqueness of pure strategy BNE can be directly proved
because E[pii(e, ci)] satisfies the conditions from U1 to U3,
and from D1 to D2 mention in [28].
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: i) It is direct to see that all the contributors may
participate in the contest for the special case n = N . The left-
hand side (LHS) of Eq.(20) is no larger than 1 if b ≤ e0, and
is greater than 1 otherwise. Hence, either all the contributors
do not exert effort, or exert the same amount of effort at the
NE.
ii) If n is less than N , b(t) is infinitely close to 0 as t
approaches infinity. Then, b(t) is in the range (0, b].
The left-hand side of Eq.(20) is strictly decreasing in e∗i .
Hence, if e∗i (tˆ) is greater than 0 for some joining time tˆ,
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then e∗i (t) ≥ e∗i (tˆ) for all t < tˆ because b(t) is a strictly
decreasing function of t. Therefore, a constant t¯ must exist
such that e∗i (t) = 0 for t ≥ t¯ while e∗i (t) is positive and
strictly decreasing for t > t¯. Note that the LHS of Eq.(20)
is maximized when E∗−i is 0. This implies b(t¯) ≥ e0, or
equivalently t ≤ b−1(e0).
iii) Assuming ti < t¯. We multiply both sides of Eq.(20)
with e∗i (t) and obtain
E
[ e0 + E∗−i
(e0 + e∗i (ti) + E
∗
−i)2
]
e∗i (ti)b(ti) = e
∗
i (ti). (59)
Denote a random variable Ω with E[Ω] = e∗i (ti)/b(ti). The
above equation yields
Ω =
e∗i (ti)
e0 + e∗i (ti) + E
∗
−i
· (1− e∗i (ti)
e0 + e∗i (ti) + E
∗
−i
) ≤ 1
4
.
Thus, we obtain
e∗i (ti) ≤
1
4
b(ti).
The equality holds at e∗i (ti) = e0 + E
∗
−i which implies e0 ≤
1
4b(ti).
When e0 is larger than 14b(ti), the upper bound of e
∗
i (ti)
can be tighter. In what follows, we present the upper bound
of e∗i (ti) for e0 ≥ 14b(ti). We take the derivative of Ω over
E∗−i and obtain
dΩ
dE∗−i
=
e∗i (ti)
(
e∗i (ti)− e0 − E∗−i
)
(e0 + e∗i (ti) + E
∗
−i)3
≤ 0.
Thus, the maximum Ω is obtained on the curve with E∗−i = 0.
Under this situation, Ω is simplified as
Ω
∣∣
E∗−i=0
=
e0e
∗
i (ti)
(e0 + e∗i (ti))2
.
We further differentiate Ω|E∗−i=0 over e∗i (ti) and obtain
dΩ
de∗i (ti)
∣∣∣
E∗−i=0
=
e0(e0 − e∗i (ti))
(e0 + e∗i (ti))3
≥ 0.
The maximum Ω is obtained at e∗i (ti) is chosen to be
1
4b(ti).
Hence, the following inequality holds
Ω ≤
1
4b(ti)e0
(e0 +
1
4b(ti))
2
.
According to Eq.(59), there has
e∗i (ti) ≤
1
4b(ti)
2e0
(e0 +
1
4b(ti))
2
.
This concludes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: To prove the existence and uniqueness of BNE, we
need to show the unique fixed point solution to the set of best
response functions. By taking the derivative of E[pii] over ei,
we obtain
dE[pii]
dei
=
N−1∑
k=0
P(k,N−1) · b
∑k+1
j=0,6=i ej
(
∑k+1
j=0 ej)
2
− 1 ≤ 0, ∀i. (60)
The equality holds for the circumstance ei ≥ 0. Since the
requester does not discriminate the contributors who join
before T , all of them exerts the same amount of effort
according to the above optimality condition.
Next, we will show the uniqueness of this symmetric
equilibrium. In Eq.(60), when the equality holds, the right-
hand is a strictly decreasing function of ei. Then, ei is unique
to enable dE[pii]dei = 0 for all i with ti ≤ T . Thus, there exists
a unique BNE in the crowdsourcing contest with termination
time strategy.
F. Derivation of Equation (35)
Equation (35) is obtained by the following steps:
E[E ] =
N∑
k=1
P(k,N)
E[
∑k
l=1 w(t˜l)]e
∗
i (e0 + ke
∗
i )
bke∗i
=
N∑
k=1
P(k,N)
∑k
l=1 E[w(t˜l)](e0 + ke∗i )
bk
=
1
bp
N∑
k=1
P(k,N)(e0+ke∗i )
∫ T
0
w(t)f(t)dt
=
(e0
bp
N∑
k=1
P(k,N) +
e∗i
bp
N∑
k=1
kP(k,N)
) ∫ T
0
w(t)f(t)dt
=
(e0
bp
(1− (1− p)N ) + Ne
∗
i
b
) ∫ T
0
w(t)f(t)dt. (61)
G. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: We prove this lemma by mathematical induction.
First of all, we claim that the integral part of Eq. (52) is∫ T
0
∫ sm
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
(
∑m
k=1
w(sk)) ds1 · · · dsm
=
Tm−1
(m− 1)!
∫ T
0
w(sm)dsm. (62)
i) When m equals to 2, the integral part of E[E|N(T ) = m]
is ∫ T
0
∫ s2
0
(w(s1) + w(s2)) ds1ds2
=
∫ T
0
∫ s2
0
w(s1) ds1ds2 +
∫ T
0
∫ s2
0
w(s2) ds1ds2
=
∫ T
0
∫ s2
0
w(s1) ds1ds2 +
∫ T
0
s2w(s2) ds2
=
∫ T
0
∫ s2
0
w(s1) ds1ds2 +
[
s2
∫ s2
0
w(x)dx
]T
0
−
∫ T
0
∫ y
0
w(x)dxdy
= T
∫ T
0
w(x)dx. (63)
ii) We assume that Eq. (53) holds for m > 2.
17
iii) For m+ 1, the integral part of Eq. (52) is∫ T
0
∫ sm+1
0
· · ·
∫ s2
0
(
∑m+1
k=0
w(sk)) ds1ds2 · · · smdsm+1
=
∫ T
0
(sm+1)
m
m!
w(sm+1)dsm+1 +
+
∫ T
0
(sm+1)
m−1
(m− 1)!
∫ sm+1
0
w(sm)dsmdsm+1
=
[ (sm+1)m
m!
∫ sm+1
0
w(sm)dsm
]T
0
=
Tm
m!
∫ T
0
w(x)dx. (64)
Therefore, our claim is proved by mathematical induction.
Submitting Eq. (62) to Eq. (52), we obtain
E[E|N(T ) = m] = e0 +me
∗
bT
∫ T
0
w(x)dx, (65)
which concludes the proof.
.
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APPENDIX-II: JUSTIFICATION OF CONTEST SUCCESS
FUNCTION
Define E as the requester’s efficiency that is the utility
brought by per-unit payment, conditioned on the fixed budget
B allocated to the contributors, i.e. E = UB
∣∣
R=B
. The requester
is able to optimize E|R=B by properly discriminating the
contributors with different joining times. An auxiliary metric
is named as “discrimination gain” denoted by G = Ed/End
where End and Ed are the requester’s efficiencies without and
with discrimination.
A. Generalized Tullock Contest Success Function
Let a = {ai}Ni=1, b = {bi}Ni=1 and v = {vi}Ni=1 be the
set of non-negative coefficients that are related to {ti}Ni=1.
For notational simplicity, we do not display {ti}Ni=1 unless
necessary. We define e−i = {ej}Nj=1,6=i and t−i = {tj}Nj=1, 6=i.
Let ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) be the reward obtained by the ith
contributor, given the sets of joining time t and effort level e.
There has
ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) =
ai(ei)
vi
e0+ai(ei)vi+
∑N
j=1, 6=i aj(ej)vj
bi, (66)
where vi is in the range (0, 1] for all i. According to contest
theory [27], this reward sharing rule coincides all the five
axioms for contest success functions (CSFs). The physical
interpretation is that a contributor acquires a larger reward if he
contributes a higher effort, and a smaller reward if any of his
opponent spends more effort. The rate of increased reward is
shrinking as this contributor exerts more and more effort. The
constant e0 is introduced by the requester that if it is positive,
the reward will not be completely assigned to the contributors.
A larger e0 means that the requester retains a higher percentage
of reward. Actually, a non-zero e0 is equivalent to introducing
a NATURE player, where e0 influences the crowdsensing effort
of all the players. Throughout this work, if not mentioned
explicitly, we suppose e0 to be 0, i.e. the whole reward will
be shared among the contributors. The vectors of coefficients,
a, b and v, are introduced to offer discriminations to different
contributors. They are placed at different “positions” in the
contest success function so to modify crowdsensing contest in
different ways.
• {ai}Ni=1 - Weight Discrimination. Given identical v and
b, for the same effort ei = ej , contributor i obtains a
higher reward than contributor j, i.e. ri > rj if ai > aj .
• {vi}Ni=1 - Exponent Discrimination. Given identical a,
b and ei = ej , we endow the early contribution a higher
exponent, that is, vi > vj if i < j.
• {bi}Ni=1 - Reward Discrimination. The maximum pos-
sible rewards obtained by different contributors can be
distinct. Given identical a, v and ei = ej , there exists
ri > rj if bi > bj .
The weight discrimination changes the priority and the expo-
nent discrimination changes the elasticity of effort in bringing
reward. Denote by R the total reward paid to the contributors
that has R =
∑N
i=1 ri([e, t]). In the incentive mechanism
design, the requester needs to make R equal to B. Once b are
homogeneous and e0 is zero, these two discrimination schemes
do not alter the total reward paid by the requester. However,
the reward discrimination scheme provides different penalties
to the maximum achievable reward, henceforth changing the
aggregate reward paid by the requester. Our main purpose is to
investigate whether these discriminate schemes can incentive
more timely effort from the contributors. To this goal, when
we manipulate one vector of coefficients, the other two vectors
of coefficients are supposed to be identical, thus effectively
simplifying our analysis.
In what follows, we analyze the NE properties of Game G1.
We reveal a couple of paradoxes in the discrimination schemes
and provide important insights on incentive mechanism design.
Challenges: A deep understanding of this incentive mech-
anism is usually intractable for two reasons: firstly, the Nash
equilibrium of a Tullock contest does not admit a close-form
solution in general; secondly, all the parameters are coupled in
a complicated way such that there does not yield any insight
without proper separation of them.
To overcome these difficulties, we simplify our analysis
in two aspects. One is to begin with the scenario of two
contributors, and then to generalize our observations to an
arbitrary population. The other is to assume that only one
set of parameters in {a,b,v} are heterogeneous among the
contributors when each of the discrimination rules is studied.
With above simplifications, we can gain important insights on
what form an appropriate incentive mechanism should take on.
Our analysis starts from a simple scenario with N = 2 if not
mentioned explicitly.
B. Nash Equilibrium with Weight Discrimination
WEIGHT DISCRIMINATION: b1 = b2 = b, v1 = v2 =
v, e0 = 0, w1 ≥ w2, a1 = a and a2 = 1.
For the special case N = 2, we can solve the unique NE in
explicit form. We suppose that the first contributor joins the
contest earlier than the second. The extent of preference to the
first contributor is reflected by the coefficient a. By letting the
derivatives dpi1de1 and
dpi2
de2
be 0, we obtain two equations that
yield the following solution
e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
abv
(1 + a)2
. (67)
The derivatives satisfy de
∗
i
da < 0 for a > 1 and
de∗i
da > 0 for
a < 1, which implies that the maximum e∗i is obtained at a =
1. The efficiency of the requester is given by E = abv(w1+w2)(1+a)2
whose maximum value is reached at a = 1. This yields the
following paradox.
Paradox 1: The weight discrimination scheme adopted by the
requester will diminish his efficiency on the contrary.
C. Nash Equilibrium with Exponent Discrimination
EXPONENT DISCRIMINATION: b1 = b2 = b, a1 =
a2 = a, e0 = 0, v1 ≥ v2 and w1 ≥ w2.
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Following the same approach, it is easy to yield e∗1 : e
∗
2 =
v1 : v2. The unique NE of G1 is a feasible solution to the
following equation(v1
v2
)2v1
(e∗2)
(v1−v2+1) + (e∗2)
(v2−v1+1) + 2
(v1
v2
)v1
e∗2
= bv2
(v1
v2
)v1
. (68)
Let us take a look at a special case with b = 1. Any reasonable
strategy of a contributor that leads to a positive payoff should
satisfy e1 ≤ 1 and e2 ≤ 1. Suppose that the both contributors
exert the same mount of effort. Due to v1 ≥ v2, there has ev11 ≤
ev12 . The late contributor obtains a higher share of the reward,
and hence a larger payoff. On the contrary, if the exponents
satisfy v1 < v2, the early contributor acquires a smaller share
of reward with e1 = e2 ≥ 1, and then a lower payoff. This
is in conflict with the original discrimination purpose to offer
more benefits to the early contributor.
The exponent discrimination scheme may degrade the re-
quester’s efficiency. Formally, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3: In the exponent discrimination with vi>vj , the
NE of game G1 satisfies: (1) e∗i > e∗j ; (2) if all the parameters
are fixed except vj , increasing vj also improves the effort of
both contributors.
Paradox 2: If the requester favors the earlier contributor by
configuring a larger exponent, the payoff of the early one
could be worse than that of the late one. A large difference
between two exponents (i.e. sufficient discrimination) leads to
the reduction of effort in the both contributors.
D. Nash Equilibrium with Reward Discrimination
REWARD DISCRIMINATION: a1 = a2 = a, v1 = v2 =
v, e0 = 0, w1 = w ≥ w2 = w/u, b1 = b > b2 = b/β.
Similarly, we suppose that the first contributor joins the
contest earlier than the second one, i.e. w1 ≥ w2. It is
reasonable to set b1 ≥ b2 in the reward discrimination. We
denote two new variables, β := b1b2 ≥ 1 and u := w1w2 ≥ 1. By
differentiating pii over ei, and letting the derivatives be 0, we
obtain e∗1 = βe
∗
2 at the unique NE. This NE is subsequently
solved by
e∗1 =
vbβv
(βv + 1)2
and e∗2 =
vbβv−1
(βv + 1)2
. (69)
Observation 1: If the requester prefers the early contribution
by setting a larger maximum achievable reward, the early
contributor exerts more effort than the late one at the NE.
Analysis on Requester’s Efficiency. The total reward paid
by the requester is
R =
b(βv + β−1)
βv + 1
≤ b. (70)
The above expression yields the efficiency of requester as
E = w1e
∗
1 + w2e
∗
2
R
=
vw(βv+1 + βv/u)
(1 + βv+1)(1 + βv)
. (71)
We next investigate the impacts of u, v and β on the efficiency.
Lemma 4: The interplays between the efficiency of re-
quester, Ed, and the parameters u, v and β are summarized
as follows:
• E is a decreasing function of u.
• There exists a constant βˆ1 such that E is an increasing
function of β if β ≤ βˆ1, and a decreasing function of
β if β > βˆ1. As β approaches infinity, the requester’s
efficiency becomes 0.
• There exists a constant βˆ2 such that E is a strictly increas-
ing function of v if β ≤ βˆ2. Otherwise, as v increases
from 0 to 1, E increases until reaching its maximum at
the extreme point vˆ, and decreases afterwards.
For the second property, if the early contributor is offered
enough preference (i.e. large β), the efficiency of requester
is low. As an example of the third property, when β is less
than 3.9026, maxv E is obtained at v = 1. This implies that a
reasonable tradeoff is to let v be 1 and β be relatively small.
We plot the relationship between E and u as well as w for
v = 0.4 and v = 1.0 in Fig.20. The efficiency of the requester
is intuitively higher in the case v = 1.
Fig. 20. Efficiency of requester with v = 0.4 (left) and v = 1 (right)
Observation 2: To acquire a high efficiency of the requester,
he needs to choose a large exponent v and a relatively small
reward ratio β in the contest function.
Analysis on Discrimination Gain. When there is no reward
discrimination, β equals to 1 so to have E = vw(u+1)4bu .
Comparing Ed (with discrimination) with End (with no dis-
crimination), we obtain
G = EdEnd =
4(uβv+1 + βv)
(1 + βv+1)(1 + βv)(1 + u)
, (72)
which clearly shows that the discrimination gain is jointly
determined by u, v and β. Recalling that contributor 1 joins
the contest earlier than contributor 2, any feasible reward
discrimination scheme must have β ≥ 1 and u ≥ 1. The
impacts of v, u and β on G is provided below.
Lemma 5: The discrimination gain G satisfies the following
properties.
• G is a decreasing function of v for all v ∈ (0, 1].
• G is an increasing function of u.
• There exists an optimal β = βˆ3 to maximize G.
The relationship between G and v as well as u is now clear.
However, it is not intuitive to show the impact of β on G.
Here, a simple example is presented. Suppose that v is 1, the
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maximum G is obtained at β = 1.5214. In Fig.21, we illustrate
the relationship between G and u as well as β in two different
cases, v = 14 and
1
2 .
Observation 3: To achieve a high discrimination gain, the
requester needs to configure a small exponent in the contest
function.
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Paradox 3: From observations 2 and 3, we find that the reward
discrimination scheme is hardly to achieve both high efficiency
and high discrimination gain.
So far, we have identified three paradoxes in the weight,
exponent and reward discrimination schemes respectively.
Though our study is limited to the case of two competing
contributors, these paradoxes usually exist in the crowdsourc-
ing with more than two contributors. Our next purpose is to
find an appropriate contest architecture that incentives more
effort from the early contributor.
E. Nature-as-a-player in Reward Discrimination Scheme
NATURE PLAYER: a1 = a2 = a, v1 = v2 = v, b1 =
b2 = b, w1 = w ≥ w2 = w/u, e0 ≥ 0.
In the previous analyses, the variable e0 is 0 by default.
Hence, the reward is completely allocated to the contributors,
no matter what their effort is. To avoid adversary scenario
that all the contributors exert little effort, the requester can
introduce nature as a player so to retain a fraction of his
reward. This nature player “exerts” a fixed amount of nonzero
virtual effort e0, while not harvesting any real reward.
After the nature player is introduced, it is plausible that
the contributors might not participate (i.e. exerting 0 effort).
To solve the NE, we take the derivative of pii over ei. The
optimality conditions result in the following (in)equalities at
the NE,
vbi(e
∗
i )
v−1(e0+
∑N
j=1,6=i(e
∗
j )
v)
(e0 +
∑N
j=1(e
∗
j )
v)2
{
= 1 if e∗i ≥ 0,
< 1 if e∗i = 0
. (73)
From the above (in)equalities, both contributors will exert
positive amount of effort at the NE when v < 1. When v = 1
and e0 ≥ bi, contributors from 1 to i always obtain negative
payoffs if they allocate any amount of effort. Their optimal
strategy is not to participate in the crowdsensing, which is
a sufficient condition. Hence, the requester can use e0 to
control how many rewards are retained and which contributors
are awarded. In general, Eqs.(73) do not admit a close-form
solution to the NE so that we need to search for e∗i iteratively.
In the beginning, a vector of values are endowed to e. Given
e−i, we compute ei using Eq.(73) for all i. Then, we repeat
the above step until eventually e converge to a very small
vicinity of the equilibrium.
The analysis of reward discrimination scheme demonstrates
that an appropriate configuration of reward ratio is able to
bring certain discrimination gain. However, the reward dis-
crimination impairs the efficiency of the requester under many
circumstances. Here, our purpose is to investigate whether the
reduction of efficiency can be mitigated by introducing the
nature player. For analytical tractability, we let b1 = b2 = b.
Then, there exists a unique symmetric NE that solves the
following equation with e∗1 = e
∗
2 = e
∗,
(e0 + 2(e
∗)v)2 = vb(e∗)v−1(e0 + (e∗)v). (74)
After certain transformations, the solution e∗ is given by
(e∗)v =
1
2
e0
( bv
bv − 4e∗ − 1
)
. (75)
The above equation yields the relationship between e∗ and e0.
Lemma 6: When nature is a player in the contest along
with homogeneous ordinary players (i.e. ai = a, bi = b and
vi = v for all i), the NE strategy of ordinary players, e∗, is a
decreasing function of e0.
The total reward paid to the contributors is given by
R = 2b(e∗)v
(
e0 + 2(e
∗)v
)−1
.
The efficiency of the requester is computed as
E = w(1+u)
2ub
((e∗)1−v(e0 + 2(e∗)v))
=
vw(1+u)
2ub
e0 + (e
∗)v
e0+2(e∗)v
=
vw(1+u)
4u
(
1+
e0
e0+2(e∗)v
)
(76)
according to Eqs.(74) and (75). The relationship between the
efficiency and nature’s effort is the following.
Lemma 7: When nature is a player in the contest, the
efficiency of requester E is an increasing function of e0. The
asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. e0 is given by
∀ 0 < v < 1 lim
e0→∞
E
v = 1 lim
e0→b−
E
 = vw(1+u)2u . (77)
For a fixed e0, the asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. b is given by
lim
b→∞
E = vw(1 + u)
4u
. (78)
Observation 4: By introducing nature as a player, the ef-
ficiency of requester can be improved at most two times.
To pursue the best efficiency, the requester is reasonable to
configure e0 as large as possible. However, a large e0 leads to
less effort from the contributors at the NE.
These small effort may incur some challenges in practical
applications when the observation of the effort contain noise.
To improve the efficiency and to obtain a large utility, the
requester needs to configure e0 and bi (∀i) jointly so that the
total reward paid to the contributors equals to the budget B.
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F. Brief Summary
We have analyzed the total utility, efficiency and dis-
crimination gain under three schemes: weight discrimination,
exponent discrimination and reward discrimination. Our ob-
servations can be summarized as below.
• The weight and exponent discrimination schemes are not
suitable for timeliness sensitive crowdsourcing contests.
• The reward discrimination scheme can achieve certain
discrimination gain, but risks the potential reduction of
the requester’s efficiency.
• By introducing a nature player, the requester’s efficiency
can be improved, while incurring great difficulty of
configuring the maximum achievable rewards and the
nature player’s effort jointly.
The optimal incentive mechanism is very difficult to obtain
due to its freedom in choosing the shape of contest success
function and configuring coupled parameters. Based on our
observations, the appropriate incentive mechanism should bear
the form
ri([ei, ti], [e−i, t−i]) =
biei
ei +
∑N
j=0,6=i ej
, ∀1≤i≤N, (79)
which is named as “standard contest function”. In contrast
to Eq.(66), though the reward allocation function in Eq.(79) is
much simpler, there are still N+1 parameters to be configured.
Especially, e0 and bi are coupled, which adds great difficulty
to the incentive mechanism design.
APPENDIX-III: PROOFS IN JUSTIFYING CONTEST SUCCESS
FUNCTION
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Recap that the prerequisite is 0 < v2 ≤ v1 ≤ 1. We
take the derivative of the right-hand of Eq.(68) over v2 and
obtain
d(v2
(
v1
v2
)v1
)
dv2
= (1− v1) ·
(v1
v2
)v1 ≥ 0. (80)
This implies that the increase of v2 causes the increase of the
right-hand in Eq.(68).
We split the left-hand of Eq.(68) into two parts as follows.
Part1 =
((v1
v2
)2v1 − 1)(e∗2)(v1−v2+1) + 2(v1v2 )v1e∗2,
Part2 = (e
∗
2)
(v1−v2+1) + (e∗2)
(v2−v1+1).
Given a fixed e∗2, as v2 increases, Part1 becomes smaller
for sure. For a fixed e∗2, the first expression in Part2 is
a decreasing function of v2, while the second one is an
increasing function of v2. We take the derivative of Part2
over v2,
dPart2
dv2
=
(
(e∗2)
(v2−v1+1) − (e∗2)(v1−v2+1)
)
log(e∗2) > 0 (81)
no matter whether e∗2 is greater than 1 or not. When v2
increases, the right-hand of Eq.(68) increases, while the left-
hand decreases if e∗2 does not change. In order to make the
equality hold, e∗2 must increase. Therefore, increasing vj will
improve the effort exerted by the both contributors.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: i) It is easy to see that E is a decreasing function of u.
ii) We take the first-order derivative of E over β,
dE
dβ
=
−vβv−1(− uβ1+v + uvβ2+2v − uvβ − uβ
u(1 + βv)2(1 + β1+v)2
+
β1+v + vβ1+2v + β1+2v − v)
u(1 + βv)2(1 + β1+v)2
(82)
where Denominator is a positive expression. We further sub-
tract the numerator denoted by Fβ from the above equation,
Fβ = uβ1+v − uvβ2+2v + uvβ + uβ − β1+v − vβ1+2v −
β1+2v + v. When β is slightly above the minimum value
(i.e. 1), Fβ is approximated by 2u − 2 which is greater than
0. Then, E is an increasing function of β in this situation.
When β is sufficiently large, Fβ is negative so that E is a
decreasing function of β. Hence, due to the continuity of E ,
there may exist one or more local extreme points. In what
follows, we will show that there exists a unique extreme point
to let Fβ = 0.
Let Gβ be the derivative of Fβ over β. There has
Gβ = (1 + v)(−2uvβ1+2v − (1 + 2v)β2v − βv + uβv + u) (83)
where it is 0 at the extreme points. Suppose Fβˆ = 0 at the
point β = βˆ1. Subtracting Gβ from Fβ at the extreme point
βˆ1, we obtain
Gβˆ1
1 + v
−Fβˆ1 = v(1 + uβˆ1)(1− (βˆ1)1+2v) ≤ 0 (84)
due to βˆ1 ≥ 1, and the equality holds at βˆ1 = 1. Thus, the
above inequality yields Gβˆ1 < 0 for any βˆ1 > 1. In the small
vicinity of βˆ1, there must have Fβ > 0 if β < βˆ1 and Fβ < 0
if β > βˆ1. We next prove the uniqueness of βˆ1. Suppose that
there are two extreme points. Then, one must be the local
maximum and the other must be the local minimum. Denote
by βˆ(a)1 the local maximum and by βˆ
(b)
1 the local minimum.
In the small vicinity of βˆ(b)1 , Fβ > 0 if β < βˆ(b)1 and Fβ < 0
if β > βˆ(b)1 . This contradicts to the assumption that there are
two extreme points. The uniqueness of βˆ1 means that there is
only one extreme point in E .
iii) We take the derivative of E over v,
dE
dv
= (β1+v + β1+2v − vβ1+2v log(β) + βv + v log(β) + 1)
· (uβ + 1)β
v
u(βv + 1)2(β1+v + 1)2
. (85)
We denote by Fv = β1+v + β1+2v − vβ1+2v log(β) + βv +
v log(β)+1. When v is small enough (i.e. v is approaching 0),
Fv is approximated 2(1 + β) which is greater than 0. Thus,
E is an increasing function of v when it is small. When v
approaches 1 and β is sufficiently large, Fv is negative so that
E is a decreasing function of v. Due to the continuity of Fv ,
it is plausible that Fv crosses 0 as v increases from 0 to 1.
Suppose that there exists a constant vˆ so to have Fvˆ = 0.
Denote a new expression Gv that is the derivative of Fv over
v,
Gv = (β1+v + β1+2v − 2vβ1+2v log(β) + βv + 1) log(β). (86)
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Because of Fvˆ = 0, there must have Gvˆ = −v(log(β))2(1 +
β1+2v) < 0. Hence, the extreme point vˆ can only be the local
maximum of the efficiency function E . As v increases from
0 to vˆ, E increases first, and decreases after v continue to
increase beyond vˆ. When β is not large enough, Fv may be
always positive so that E always increases with regard to v.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof: i) We first take the derivative of G over v and obtain
dG
dv
=
4(log β)(uβv+1 + βv)(1− β2v+1)
(1 + βv+1)2(1 + βv)2(1 + u)
< 0. (87)
Therefore, the discrimination gain is a decreasing function of
the exponent v when other coefficients are fixed. When v = 1,
the minimum G is obtained by 4(uβ2+β)(1+β2)(1+β)(1+u) ; when v → 0,
the maximum G is approximated by 2(1+uβ)(1+β)(1+u) .
ii) The derivative of G over u is given by
dG
du
=
4(βv+1 − βv)
(1 + βv+1)(1 + βv)(1 + u)2
≥ 0 (88)
and the equality holds at β = 1. Hence, as u grows,
the discrimination gain G increases correspondingly, which
strengthens the effect of reward discrimination scheme. The
asymptotic gain is expressed as
lim
u→∞G =
4βv+1
(1 + βv+1)(1 + βv)
,
lim
u→1
G = 2(β
v + β1+v)
(1 + βv)(1 + β1+v)
.
iii) We further take the derivative of above expression over
β and compute the optimal βˆ3 to maximize the discrimination
gain. Here, βˆ3 is the unique feasible solution to an implicit
equation,
vβ2v+1 − βv − (1 + v) = 0. (89)
Therefore, according to Eqs.(89) and (89), the asymptotic
discrimination gain increases with β first until reaching the
maximum value, and then decreases as β further increases.
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction. We take the
derivative of e∗ over e0 in Eq.(74), de
∗
de0
=
−4(e∗)v − 2e0 + vb(e∗)v−1
8v(e∗)2v−1+4v(e∗)v−1e0+bv(1−v)(e∗)v−2e0−bv(2v−1)(e∗)2v−2 . (90)
Suppose de
∗
de0
= 0 at a point e∗∗ ≥ 0. Therefore, there exists
4(e∗∗)v + 2e0 = vb(e∗∗)v−1. (91)
Submitting the above equation to Eq.(74), we obtain
(e0+2(e
∗∗)v)2 =
1
4
v2b2(e∗∗)2v−2,
vb(e∗∗)v−1(e0+(e∗∗)v) =
1
4
v2b2(e∗∗)2v−2+
1
2
vb(e∗∗)v−1e0.
Hence, for any non-negative e∗∗ to enable de
∗
de0
= 0, there can
only have e0 = 0. Recall that we assume de
∗
de0
= 0 at the point
e∗∗ ≥ 0 for any e0 > 0. This contradiction manifests that e∗
is a monotone function of e0 for e0 ≥ 0.
We next consider a special case e∗ = (e0)
1
v . Accord-
ing to Eq.(74), there has e∗ = 2vb9 . The nominator of
de∗
de0
is − 32vb(e∗)v−1, and the denominator is greater than
5
3bv
2(e∗)2v−2. Hence, e∗ is a strictly decreasing function of
e0 for e∗ ≥ 0 and e0 ≥ 0.
E. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: The first argument is a direct result of Lemma 6. When
e0 increases, e∗ decreases such that E becomes larger and
larger. For v ∈ (0, 1), as e0 grows to infinity, e∗ approaches 0.
For v = 1, when e0 is infinitely close to b−, e∗ also approaches
0. Then, the asymptotic efficiency w.r.t. e0 is
vw(1+u)
2u . When
e0 is fixed and b increases to infinity, e∗ also increases to
infinity. Then, E decreases until vw(1+u)2u according to Eq.(76).
